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IN THE SUPREI\JIE COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS CHARLES· PETER-
SON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7757 
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Third 
Judicial District Court of the State of Utah, in and for 
the County of Salt Lake, against the above named de-
fendant; the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, Judge. 
The defendant was infor1ned against by the District 
Attorney of the Third Judicial District by an infornla-
. tion and accused of the cri1nes of BURGLARY IN THE 
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I 
SECOND DEGREE and GRAND LARCENCY, TO 
WIT: that the· defendant on or about March 25, 1951, 
* * * entered the building of Clarence L. 1\1eans in the 
night time with intent to commit larceny therein; and 
that the defendant on or about March 25, 1951, stole 
from Clarence L. Means personal property having a 
value in excess of $50.00, lawful money of the United 
States. The cas.e was tried before a jury June 13, 1951, 
and a verdict was returned as follows: 
"We, the Jurors impaneled in the above case, 
find the defendant guilty of the crime of Grand 
Larceny as charged in the Information, and not 
guilty of the crime of B-q.rglary in the S.econd 
Degree.'' 
THE EVIDENCE 
CLARENCE L. MEANS, the complainant, 'vas 
owner of Torch Tavern, at 477 South Main, front en-
trance on Main, with driveway running back of building 
from 5th South; at back of building is a door with win-
dow south of it. He closed his business at 1 A.l\L 
March 25 and checked doors and windows. Pursuant 
to visit of a policeman later, he went to the tavern and 
saw one back door, leading from toilet, partly open, and 
a back window with a small square broken out; and he 
observed a television set, electric drill and other prop-
erty had been taken; next saw articles about 6 A.M. 
Sunday at police station. (Tr. 3-12) Means had known 
defendant for 4 or 5 years, but had not seen him for 
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about 1 year. ( Tr. 1~~-l~~) The big windovv in \Yhich 
a pane 'vns broken is barred, but in judgment of witness 
afforded sufficient protection inasmuch as a person 
could not cra,vl bet1veen the bars; (Tr. 17-18) bars about 
8 or 10 inches apart; the door in back was open in the 
morning- it had been locked on inside and nailed. (Tr. 
19) Means did not knovv Charles ~f. Olmsted. (Tr. 24) 
DANIEL .L~. DUN testified that he and Edward 
Peterson, after being at Dee's Hamburger at about 3 :30 
A. M., were standing talking on 5th South and east of 
The Torch, he observed a car drive out of parking lot 
east of The Torch, turn right and go West; .rear door 
was open but went shut; trunk lid partly up; some 
object in trunk. They v;ent back to investigate; observed 
window broken and rear door partly open ; called police 
about 3 :55; waited until officers Clayton and Olsen 
arrived at 4:00. (Tr. 32-36) He did not see anyone 
in car; watched it to at least vVest Temple. (Tr. 27) 
EDWARD PETERSON, testified that early morn-
ing of March 25 he a:hd Dan Dun walked north on . 
Main past The Torch; he heard son1ething fall in The 
Torch but thought it was the janitor; when they came 
back and were standing talking he saw a car drive from 
driveway over sidewalk at too fast ~ rate of speed; 
he did not pay much attention to car; only saw license 
number, which he detected v1as 484; the trunk lid was 
up; it appeared to him there was a safe in the back 
of the car; looked like two in the car; \vent west on 
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5th South at a high rate of speed; he and Dun \vent to 
The Torch tavern and saw a window broken and a door 
partly op·en. Dun called the police between ,3 :30 and 
4 :00; officers came later; he did not know if occupants 
were male or female. (Tr. 54-57) 
JACI{ MERRICK, special officer on duty along 
5th West Street early morning of March 25 near corner 
of 2nd South; saw a car going north; trunk open about 
a foot, black objeet sticking out; he fell in behind, gave 
chase to almost North Temple and 5th West ; lead car 
made left turn into alley ·at 49 N. 5th West; two n1en 
jumped out; witness followed driver through field or 
alley and overtook him; asked by officer what was in 
car man told him a television set he obtained from a ... 
friend after a fight; man then ran away north; witness 
phoned the police dispatcher 4 :04; between 8 to 10 min-
utes after witness had first seen the car; witness iden-
tified man in court as defendant; witness with other 
officeTs went to pursued car and did some checking on 
articles in car. He testified the pursued car made a 
turn into a narrow driveway for about half block from · 
sidewalk which led into a place where there are all kinds 
of shacks and a lot of rubbish. (Tr. 76-76) It was dark 
back· tliere, no lights; witness fired 'tvvo shots; man came 
back; witness did not identify man, but man said his 
name Chuck or Chick Peterson and the man with him 
was Kenny S-olomon; witness did not see man again for 
few days in county jail; he reported name man told hiin 
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and sa"~ ~~o1ne pictures of hi1n; n1an pursued had levis 
and a blue striped shirt on; I·~aster n1orni.ng and no 
coat on or Y~~itll hiln. (Tr. 7G-S~1) On redirect: there 
were arc lights and sign light, and witness had flash 
light at n1an's face so he could readily observe features. 
(Tr. 83) 
nl. L. HUNSAI(ER, police officer on duty early 
hours of ~:larch 25; about 4 o'clock received call to 
look for a car, make not positive; numbers ori license 
484; 8 or 10 minutes later call from Officer Merrick 
came; went to Merrick, saw car with nun1bers 484 on 
license; they checked some articles in car; witness took 
Pontiac to Headquarters, keys \vere in car; witness 
identified articles taken from car and -exhibit "E" as a 
list. (Tr. 84-90) On cross: the television was dusted 
for prints; he never saw any; never saw defendant until 
preliminary hearing. (Tr. 93) 
11. W .. OLSON, police officer, in early hours of 
1iarch 25 went to Torch Tavern and made examination 
of broken window, and bars; said bars vv-ere sufficiently 
far apart so a person could get thru them; purpose was 
to deterrlline means of entry, but made no measurement 
of space between bars; opined defendant could go thru 
bars; he checked windows for way of opening, but did 
not rep·ort anything on that, nor if they went thru the 
bars. (Tr. 94-98) 
DOUGLAS. CHARLES PETERSON, the defend-
ant, on evening of J.\IIarch 24 was home 'vith wife and 
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four children at 69 North 5th West; wife had not been 
out for long time, and he secured his Grandmother to 
take over the children and he and his wife ·left home 
about 10 o'clock and went to Airpo'rt Gardens at North 
Temple about 30th West; drove out in 1939 Dodge 
Coupe·; they danced and defendant played in band; left 
about 1 :15 A.M. Sunday, had trouble getting car started; 
went directly home-about 15 minute drive; the 1941 
Pontiac was missing from back yard-it was there when 
they left; he had been dickering with Charles Olmsted· 
on transfer of Dodge to Olmsted, and had let the latter 
drive the car; defendant and wife went in their house, 
and defendant walked Grandmother (Clara ·Turner) 
home; went back, and he and wife went to bed. It was 
about 2 o'clock. (Tr. 99-103) 
After going to bed they were awakened by phone; 
it was Olmsted who called. Witness here attempted to 
relate convers~tion on phone when State objected on 
ground of hearsay. MR. L UNT (defense counsel) : 
"Now, if the Court please, I think we have a chance to 
go into this matter at this time. Mr. Obnsted was 
charged and has not been apprehended for this crime, 
and I think we have a right to go into the whole busi-
ness.." (Tr. 103) The State withdrew its objection to 
permit of testimony as to the whole occurrence. (Tr. 
109) And defendant then testified to the effect: (Tr. 110) 
that Olmsted said he had defendant's Pontiac and asked 
defendant to hurry over to 5th West between 2nd and 
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3rd South-that it 'Yas ilnportant; that defendant hur-
riedly put on pants, shoes and shirt 'vithout buttoning 
shirt, and rru1 over to designated place. There was the 
Pontiac; first tin1e he had seen it after leaving home 
about 10 preYious evening. Olmsted approached car, 
and defendant having seen trunk open asked what 'vas 
in it. Being told by Olmsted 'vhat, and how he obtained 
the property, defendant told him to get stuff out right 
now,-to get rid of it; that defendant would have no 
part of it. Because of condition of car it had stopped 
on Olmsted, and after some trouble they started; de-
fendant jumped in car and was going to get off over 
home. (Tr. 110-112) Defendant intended getting off at 
front of house, but Olmsted turned down drive,vay; 
saw car con1ing about llf2 blocks away; it pulled in 
behind; Olmsted turned key off, jumped out and hollered~ 
"Run, Pete." D-efendant, being scared and panicky, 
and by influence of suggestion, jumped and ran; defend·· 
ant had been fast asleep when property was . stolen; 
they ran together through the field, defendant behind; 
defendant then thought, what reason did he have to 
run, stopped and started back to the officer; defendant's 
shirt tail was out and shirt unbuttoned,-had no inten-
tion of taking shirt off; he had been 40 to 50 feet in 
lead of officer and could have run behind some houses, 
but went back to officer and car. Officer asked what 
was in back of car, and defendant said a television set, 
and related,-"This friend of mine got it, went down to 
son1e people's houses, and it is his television." Then 
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they walked to Salt Lake ~filling door, about. 20 to 25 
feet from driveway where defendant lived; the officer, 
about 10 feet behind, stopped to awaken night•.vatch and 
call police, and defendant continued walking right into 
his house; told his wife what had happened, and sat 
there about lj2 hour. (Tr. 112-114) Defendant about 5 
o'clock walked over to Grandmother's, about a ·block 
away; his wife and Ohnsted came over later; defendant 
complained to Olmsted about what happened, and at 
that time Olmsted wrote, in presence of Grandmother, 
defendant and his wife, on his driver's license and signed 
his name, which writing was identified as defendant 
exhibit 1, and gave it to defendant, \vho in turn ga':e 
it to !{r. Blazzard of Police department, when defend-
ant went to police department folJowing Tuesday at 
8 :00 A.!{. and related the events. Defendallt denies 
he was in, near or by the Torch Tavern on the morning 
of !farch 25, 1951, and denied the burglary. At a recess 
defendant n1easured the bars on the Torch Tavern win-
dow which had been broken; the window is 42 inches 
wide, bars about 1 inch thick and 8 bars between ends. 
(Tr. 114-120) On cross, defendant denied any mention 
of Kenny Solomon, or that he gave the address of 553 
Jeremy Ave. Asked if he had ever been convicted of a 
felony and he answered, "yes"; Q. What were they~ 
A. One was in 1947 for grand larceny, and I was con-
victed again in 1949 or 1950 for unlawful sale of Govern-
ment property. (Tr. 122-124) 
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\VIL~IA PETERSON, 'yife of defendant, related 
going to Airport Gardens about 10 o'clock; Pontiac there 
when they left, but gone on return; defendant walked 
home 'Yith Grandn1other, and in short time came back, 
and both went to bed; the phone rang and wife handed 
it to defendant, and she heard him talk on phone; then 
defendant grabbed his pants and stuff and said he had 
to run over to 5th West and 2nd South; shortly defend-
ant came back in and then left for Grandmother's, leav-
ing word if Olmsted came to bring him over; later Olm-
sted came, and she and he went over to Grandmother's; 
she saw Olmsted write and sign his name, and read what 
was written. (Tr. 126-128) 
CLARA TURNER, the grandmother of defendant, 
testified she 'vent over to Peterson home; defendant and 
wife left about 10 o'clock; returned about 1 or later; 
defendant mentioned about car being gone; he walked 
her home and went back home; later defendant, his wife 
and Olmsted were at her place; she saw Olmsted write 
and sign his name. (Tr. 128-132) 
Defendant offered exhibit 1 which was objected to 
as hearsay and self serving; objection sustained. (Tr. 
132) No objections (exceptions) to Court's instructions 
by defense. ( Tr. 133) 
The instructions given by the Court appear in the 
Record on Appeal, pages 16 to 28. 
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS 
1. The rrrial Court erred in sustaining objections to 
defendant's proposed exhibit 1, for the reason that the 
written confession of Charles Olmsted "\Vas a sequence 
to facts p,roved which had an inherent te:~:dency to con-
nect said Olmsted with the actual corn1nission of the 
crime. (Tr. 132) 
2. The Court erred in not instructing the jury at 
the close of the evidence to return a verdict of acquittal 
on both charges and included offenses; (Instr. Record 
16-28) for the reason that the evidence is such that 
reasonable men carinot differ upon the fact that it 
includes a reasonable hypothesis of innocence of the 
defendant; and such was a matter of law for the Court. 
3. The verdict of the jury is contrary to law and 
the evidence. 
4. The Court erred in not instructing the jury cir-
cumscribing their consideration of the cross examina-
tion of the defendant as to conviction of a prior felony 
to the matter and point of the credibility of the witness. 
ARGUMENT 
Assignment No. 1 
. The Trial Court erred in sustaining objection to 
defendant's proposed exhibit No. 1, for the reason that 
the written confession of Charles Olmsted was a sequence 
10 
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to facts p:: .. oved \vhich h~.d an inherent tendency to con-
nect said Ohnsted \vith the actual con1mission of the 
crime. 
There is nothing to refute the testimony of defend-
ant and no conflict in the evidence, to the effect that it 
\Yas Olmsted \Yho had the Pontiac license number 484, 
and \Yhatever property there \vas in the car at the time 
\\?hen defendant met him on 5th West and 2nd South 
after the phone call to defendant's ho1ne; and the writing 
on exhibit 1 came in such sequence as to be a part of the 
res gestae. We believe the view is tenable and applic-
able in this case as set out in PEOPLE VS .. MENDEZ 
(Cal.), 2~3 Pac. 64, (K 21) page 70: 
". . . Confessions, threats, and circumstances of 
flight on the part of third persons are all in the 
nature of declarations or admissions of such third 
persons, and are therefore hearsay, unless they 
come within the res gestae exception to the hear-
say rule. It does not seem to us that they may 
be justly regarded as part of the res gestae 
unless and until evidence is produced which has 
an inherent tendecy to connect such pe.rsons with 
the actual con~1nission of the crime.'' 
And this theory is further sustained by further observa-
tions herein on other assignments. 
In GILDER VS. STATE (Tex. 1911), 133 S. W. 
883, a conviction of burglal'Y was reveTsed because of 
refusal of trial court to grant a continuance to allow 
defendant an opportunity to have present some absent 
II 
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witnesses, one to prove confession of a third party. Said 
the Court: 
"By another one of the absent witnesses he 
alleges he could have established the fact that the 
witness. Smith admitted taking the guns. In other 
words, he proposed to prove the confession of 
Smith. His alibi and his statements as to how 
he came in possession of the guns and the con-
fession of Smith could be entirely in harmony 
with every other charge, which would afford, if 
the jury believed it, fully sufficient reasons why 
they should not return a verdict against him . . . 
should submit defense matters to the jury." 
UNDERHILL'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, 4th Ed. 
Sec. 296: 
. ''It frequently happens that the accused re-
sorts to the defense that another committed the 
crime, especially where the state's evidence is 
circumstantial. Such evidence is generally held 
admissible if relating to the res gestae, if guilt 
of the other party is consistent with the innocence 
of the defendant, and there are facts in evidence 
pointing to the guilt of someone other than the 
accused." Citing, PEOPLE VS. V ATEK, 71 Cal. 
App. 453, 263 Pac. 163; STATE VS. CA VINEES, 
40 Id. 500, 235 Pac. 890; and other cases." 
Assignments No. 2 and 3 
The Court erred in not instructing the jury at the 
close of the evidence to return a verdict of acquittal 
on both charges and included offenses for the reason 
12 
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that the evidence is such that reasonable men cannot 
differ upon the fact that it includes a reasonable hy-
pothesis of innocence of the defendant, and such was a 
n1atter of la"'" for the Court. And, that being so, the 
verdict of the jury is contrary to laY\"' and the evidence. 
There is no evidence, finger prints or otherwise, 
that connects defendant 'vith any taking, receiving, aid-
ing or abetting in the taking of the stolen property. 
The circumstances established by the evidence are all to 
the contrary. On the cold Easter morning he was out 
'vith only an unbuttoned shirt on-no coat on or with 
him. His running from the car can easily be perceived 
as a spontaneous action under the circumstances without 
the reflection of any guilty scienter ; and his return to 
the officer and car when he could have run and hid 
refutes the idea of a guilty conscience. As to defendant's 
whereabouts 'vhen the breaking-in took place is estab-
lished without refutation. Under the evidence any rea-
sonable man can deduce the hypothesis of innocence of 
the defendant: 
In STATE VS. BURCH, 100 Utah 414, 115 Pac. 
2nd 911, it is said : 
"If circumstantial evidence is submitted to a 
jury, it is accompanied by an instruction that to 
convict upon such evidence, that evidence must 
exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence 
... BUT IF THE EVIDENCE IS SUCH THAT 
REASONABLE MEN WOULD NOT DIF·FER 
UPON THE ·FACT THAT IT INCLUDES 
13 
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SUCH AN HYPOTHESIS, THEN IT IS NOT 
A QUESTION FOR THE JURY, BUT IS ONE 
FOR THE COURT." (Emphasis ours. 
20 AM. JUR. 1060 : 
" ... If the circumstances established are de-
pendent one upon another, each rnust be consist-
ent only with the theory of guilt in order that a 
conviction may stand." 
STATE VS. WELLS., 35 Utah, 400, 100 P. 691, 136 
Al\I. ST. REP. 1059, 19 ANN CAS. 631: 
". . . When a fact which is an essential element 
to constitute a crime is sought to be proven by 
circumstances alone, it is not enough that the 
conclusions sought to be proven may be inferred 
therefrom, but they must also be inconsistent with 
every other reasonable conclusion." ( Straup) 
To same effect is 16 C. J. 1011, S.ec. 2436. 
Assignment No. 4 
The Court erred in not instructing the jury circuin-
scribing their consideration of the cross examination 
of the defendant as to conviction of a prior felony. 
The rule is as stated in UNDERHILL'S CRIMIN-
AL EVIDENCE (4th Ed.), Sec. 140: 
"The defendant may be questioned when he 
becomes a witness in his own behalf concerning 
specific acts in order to test his credibility of 
his testimony. Thus his previous conviction of a 
felony may be shown." 
14 
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16 C. J. 586, Par. 1132: 
"The general rule is that, on a prosecution 
for a particular crin1e, evidence which in any 
manner shows or tends to show that accused has 
committed another crilne 'vholly independent of 
that for which he is on trial, even though it is a 
crilne of the same sort, is irrelevant and inad-
. "bl ,, llllSSl e ... 
See also 16 C. J. 595, Sec. 1149. 
It will be observed that the charge included two 
offenses-burglary and grand larceny. If defendant were 
guilty at all, he was guilty of burglary as well as grand 
larceny, AND· the jury brought in a verdict of GRAND 
LARCENY ALONE. Evidently the verdict was predi-
cated upon the truthful statement of the defendant as 
to a prior conviction, instead of having been limited by 
a proper instruction as to the purpose of such cross-
examination, which would have added credence to his 
testimony, and entitled him to an acquittal. Certainly 
defendant could not have be~n guilty of grand larceny 
had he not been guilty of burglary in this instance, but 
the grand larceny verdict only v¥as predicated upon the 
cross· examination as to a prior convictio~ of grand 
larceny. 
CONCLUSI01~ 
We are not unmindful of the general rule of practice 
that this Court reviews only those matters that come 
IS 
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before it whereon exceptions and objections have been 
taken in the Court below according to technical formal 
procedure. After all, we believe, this Court is not sitting 
as an umpire rating the scores of legal strategists, but 
rather the umpire to determine and grant legal rights 
of the citizens who come before it. And -vv ... e predicate this 
belief upon the expressions of this Court in STATE VS. 
COBO, ______ Utah ______ , 60 Pac. 2nd. 952, v1here the court 
said at page 958 : 
" ... In these days of 'videspread advocacy of 
reformed procedure in crin1inal cases to heal and 
cure misgivings and faulty prosecutions, the 
safeguards of the rights and privileges of the 
accused should not be overlooked and a loose 
rein held for the prosecution and a tight, techni-
cal, and restricted rein held on the accused." 
This Court in STATE VS. COBO, supra, cites ample 
authority for the application of the exception to the gen-
eral rule in view of the record and transcript submitted 
on this appeal. 
If a person can be convicted on the .evidence in this 
case, being out on parole, on the basis of his prior con-
viction, without proper instructions relative to cross 
examination as to prior convictions circumscribing the 
consideration of the jury as to such examination, then 
we are going far fetched from the purpose of per1nitting 
cross examination as to prior convictions. We will then, 
as perhaps- in this case 'vas done, convict a parolee on no 
other grounds than that he told the truth. This is a 
16 
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point of serious concern in this particular case, and '\Ve 
urge consideration on the part of this Court .. 
Respectfully subn1itted, 
EKsAYN ANDERSON and 
P. N. ANDERSON, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
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